Email Spoofing Checker
Can someone send email pretending to be you? Check your domain's SPF, DKIM and DMARC records, with a plain-English verdict, a score out of 100 and a fix for every gap.
Free tool · Domain Hijack Checker
Enter your domain to check the settings that stop someone taking it over: registrar locks, the renewal date, DNSSEC, certificate controls and forgotten subdomains. You'll get a score out of 100 and a fix for every gap.
The checker
The checker reads your domain's public registration record and DNS, the same data anyone can look up. It never connects to your website.
Your result
0out of 100
Fixes first, then improvements, then passes.
Send us your result and we'll reply personally with the changes we'd make first, and who in your business or at your registrar can make them. Free, with no obligation.
This is an automated check of public registration and DNS data, not a security audit. If you think your domain has already been taken over, contact your registrar straight away.
The guide
Domain hijacking is when someone takes control of your domain name, or of where it points, without your permission. Once they have it, they decide where your visitors and your email go.
It usually happens in one of four ways:
Yes. On 31 October 2026, Crypto Briefing reported that at least 12 DeFi websites registered with Name.com had been hijacked through DNS changes made at the registrar. Visitors who typed the correct address were sent to copies of the sites loaded with a wallet drainer, and about $138,000 had been traced as stolen at the time of the report. The underlying code was never breached: the attackers only needed control of where the domains pointed.
The same approach works against any business. A hijacked domain can serve a fake checkout, collect logins, intercept email or simply go dark, and every ranking, backlink and AI citation you've earned goes with it.
The checker runs eight checks in two groups, worth 100 points in total. Registration checks read your domain's public record from its registry through RDAP, the modern replacement for WHOIS. DNS checks read your live DNS records.
Whether the registry will refuse requests to move your domain to another registrar. The lock shows in your registration record as clientTransferProhibited, or serverTransferProhibited if it's set at the registry.
How to fix: Turn on the transfer lock, sometimes called a registrar lock or domain lock, in your registrar's control panel. Almost every registrar offers it free.
How long until the registration expires. A lapsed domain can be registered by someone else, along with every link, ranking and email address that points to it.
How to fix: Turn on auto-renew, pay with a company card that won't expire, and renew for several years at a time.
Whether the registry will refuse changes to the registration, including the nameservers that control where your website and email go (clientUpdateProhibited or serverUpdateProhibited).
How to fix: Ask your registrar whether it offers an update lock. Not all do, and some include it in a paid security add-on.
Whether the registry will refuse requests to delete the domain (clientDeleteProhibited or serverDeleteProhibited).
How to fix: Turn on the delete lock if your registrar offers it. It's usually in the same settings as the transfer lock.
Whether your DNS answers are digitally signed, so resolvers can reject forged ones, and whether the signatures validate. Broken DNSSEC is worse than none, because validating resolvers refuse to load the site.
How to fix: Turn on DNSSEC with your DNS provider and add the DS record at your registrar. Many providers do both in one step. If it's broken, fix or remove it quickly.
Whether your domain has at least two nameservers, the servers that tell the internet where your website and email live.
How to fix: Use at least two nameservers. Your DNS provider will normally supply them, so check the nameserver settings at your registrar match what the provider gives you.
Whether your DNS limits which certificate authorities can issue HTTPS certificates for your domain. Without one, any public certificate authority may issue them.
How to fix: Add a CAA record naming the certificate authority you use, for example 0 issue "letsencrypt.org". Your host can tell you which one that is.
Whether 20 common subdomains, such as blog, shop and help, point to a service that no longer exists. Someone else could claim that service and publish under your name.
How to fix: Delete the DNS record for any subdomain you no longer use, or reconnect it to the service it points to.
Locks show up in your domain's public record as status codes. ICANN's guide to EPP status codes explains that registrars set the “client” codes, while registries set the “server” codes, which take precedence. These are the ones that protect you:
| Status code | Set by | What it does |
|---|---|---|
clientTransferProhibited | Your registrar | The registry rejects requests to transfer the domain to another registrar. |
clientUpdateProhibited | Your registrar | The registry rejects requests to update the domain, such as changing its nameservers. |
clientDeleteProhibited | Your registrar | The registry rejects requests to delete the domain. |
serverTransferProhibited | The registry | The domain can't be transferred to another registrar. |
serverUpdateProhibited | The registry | The domain is locked against updates. |
When both server codes are set, the domain has a registry lock: changes need manual checks by the registry. It usually costs extra and suits domains a business can't afford to lose for even an hour.
These steps follow the NCSC's guidance on managing public domain names, plus the settings this checker tests.
Not on its own. ICANN describes DNSSEC as adding digital signatures to DNS, so resolvers can detect forged answers and discard them. That protects against attacks such as cache poisoning, where fake DNS data is slipped into a resolver.
It doesn't help if someone logs in to your registrar and changes your nameservers, because the registry treats that as a genuine change. That's why the checker gives the transfer lock and renewal date more weight than DNSSEC.
MDN's guide to subdomain takeovers describes the problem: a subdomain still has a CNAME record pointing to a hosting provider, but nothing is hosted there any more. Anyone who sets up an account with the same name at that provider can publish content on your subdomain.
It's common after a campaign site, help desk or blog is switched off and the DNS record is left behind. The checker tests 20 common subdomains and flags any that point to a name that no longer exists. It also lists subdomains that point to outside services, so you can confirm you still use them.
Each check is worth a set number of points, 100 in total. A pass earns all of them, “Improve” earns half and “Fix” earns none. Checks that can't run for your domain are left out, and your score is scaled from the rest.
Basic protections are missing. Start with the transfer lock and auto-renew, which are free and take minutes, then work down the list.
Some protections are in place, but there are gaps someone could use. Fix anything marked “Fix” first.
The important locks are on. The remaining points usually come from DNSSEC, a CAA record or an update lock.
Strong protection on everything this checker can see. Keep your registrar account secure with two-step verification, because locks only help if nobody else can log in and remove them.
Domain hijacking is when someone takes control of your domain name, or of where it points, without your permission. They might log in to your registrar account, transfer the domain away, register it after it lapses, or claim a subdomain you forgot about. They can then send your visitors and email wherever they like.
A registrar lock, or transfer lock, is a setting your registrar applies so the registry rejects requests to move your domain to another registrar. It shows in public registration data as clientTransferProhibited. It's free with almost every registrar, and you can switch it off yourself when you want to move.
Not on its own. DNSSEC signs your DNS answers so resolvers can reject forged ones, which protects against attacks such as cache poisoning. If someone gets into your registrar account and changes your nameservers, DNSSEC won't stop them. Account security and registrar locks matter more for that.
It's a record that still points to a service you no longer use, such as an old blog host or help desk. If someone else signs up to that service with the same name, they can publish content on your subdomain. MDN calls this a subdomain takeover.
Some registries, including those for .io and .so, don't publish registration data through RDAP, the public lookup service the checker uses. The DNS checks still run, and your score is calculated from the checks that could run. Ask your registrar about locks and renewal for the rest.
Yes. The checker reads public DNS records and public registration data, the same information any browser, email server or WHOIS lookup sees. It doesn't connect to the website itself.
Your browser looks it up through Google Public DNS (or Cloudflare's if Google doesn't respond) and the public RDAP service at rdap.org. It isn't sent to us unless you request a review.
No. The checker can't see the most important protection: whether your registrar account uses a strong password and two-step verification. It also doesn't check your website, hosting or email security. It isn't a security audit, but it does cover the settings attackers most often find missing.
Keep going
Can someone send email pretending to be you? Check your domain's SPF, DKIM and DMARC records, with a plain-English verdict, a score out of 100 and a fix for every gap.
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